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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SOUTHERN UTAH FEDERAL 
CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
OLYMPUS BANK and 
and JOSEPH E. STEVENS, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 930329-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE JOSEPH E. STEVENS 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appeal was taken to the Utah Supreme Court on the 
authority of Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3) (j) . The Supreme Court 
assigned the case to this Court, and this Court has jurisdiction, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) and Rule 42 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
This action is a challenge to the validity of a trustee's 
foreclosure sale by which Appellant Credit Union's interest in 
certain real property was extinguished. This Court must determine 
whether the District Court erred in its summary judgment that the 
foreclosure sale was valid as a matter of law because the purpose 
of the statutory notice requirement was met, the Notice of 
Trustee's Sale adequately described the place of sale, the 
interests of the debtors were not sacrificed in the sale and any 
injury to the Credit Union resulted from its own error. 
The standard of review is that of "correctness" as to the 
District Court's conclusions of law and its determination that 
there were no genuine issues of material fact. Neiderhauser 
Builders & Development Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 
App. 1992). In review of this summary judgment, this Court should 
apply the same Rule 56 standard as that applied by the District 
Court, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Barber v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 751 P.2d 248, 251 (Utah App. 1988); 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULE 
The Credit Union bases its appeal on a restrictive 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-25(2) regarding trustee's 
sales: 
The sale shall be held at the time and place 
designated in the notice of sale which shall be 
between the hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. and at the 
courthouse of the county in which the property to 
be sold, or some part thereof, is situated. 
Appellee Stevens submits that this statute is relevant, but 
not necessarily determinative of the issues before this Court. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, also contains the 
following applicable standard: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. Appellant is a credit union which 
held an interest in certain real property pursuant to a second 
trust deed. Appellee Olympus Bank was the beneficiary of the first 
trust deed interest in the same real property. The debtor and 
property owner, who is not a party to this action, defaulted his 
obligations to the Bank, and the Bank commenced foreclosure of the 
first trust deed under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-23 et 
sea., by giving Notice of Default followed by Notice of Trustee's 
Sale. The Notice (see Addendum) specified the place of sale as 
"the Washington County Courthouse, at or about 197 East Tabernacle, 
St. George, Washington County, Utah." The building at the 
specified address formerly housed the courts of Washington County, 
but now houses other county officers, including the County 
Recorder. Washington County courts are now housed in the 
Washington County Hall of Justice, three blocks away from the 
address given in the Notice of Trustee's Sale. 
On the day of sale, October 20, 1992, the Bank's 
representative and five other persons went to the place of sale 
specified in the Notice. The Credit Union's representative and its 
attorney went to the Hall of Justice and found no sale there. The 
Bank's representative sold the real property at public auction at 
the address specified in the notice, and Appellee Joseph E. Stevens 
was the highest bidder. 
Having lost its subordinate interest in the real property 
without being present to bid at the sale, the Credit Union 
challenged the validity of the notice and the place of sale. 
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B. Course of proceedings. The Credit Union filed its 
Complaint on November 6, 1992, and obtained a temporary restraining 
order, without hearing or prior notice, which prohibited the Bank 
from delivering to Mr. Stevens the trustee's deed to the real 
property. Counsel for the Bank and Mr. Stevens later stipulated to 
continuance of the temporary restraining order pending the District 
Court's disposition of the case. By informal stipulation of 
counsel, Answers to the Complaint were not filed. 
On November 25, 1992, the Bank filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supporting documents. On December 8, 1992, the Credit 
Union filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment and objection to 
the Bank's motion, with supporting documents. The Credit Union 
stipulated to the Bank's statement of facts, however, and added two 
affidavits which both supported the stipulated facts and added 
other unstipulated statements. On December 14, 1992, Mr. Stevens 
filed his Memorandum of Points and Authorities, joining the Bank's 
motion and opposing the Credit Union's motion. Mr. Stevens also 
stipulated to the Bank's statement of facts, with th<* exception of 
the last sentence of the Bank's paragraph 19. Mr. Stevens further 
submitted his own affidavit as to additional facts. 
Oral argument on both motions was heard by the District Court 
on December 17, 1992. 
C. Disposition by the District Court. The District Court 
granted the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the 
Credit Union's motion on the basis of the facts which were 
stipulated by all parties. The District Court concluded that there 
were no genuine issues of material fact. The District Court 
further concluded, on the principal basis of a prior decision of 
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this Court, that the trustee's sale was valid because the Notice of 
Trustee's Sale met the purposes of the statutory notice 
requirement, it adequately described the location of the sale-, 
there was no evidence that the debtor's interests were sacrificed 
in the sale and any injury to the Credit Union resulted from its 
own error. Consequently, the District Court terminated the 
temporary restraining order and dismissed the Credit Union's 
Complaint. 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
A. Stipulated facts. As noted above, the Bank filed the 
first Motion for Summary Judgment in this action. Its supporting 
Memorandum contains twenty-six paragraphs of "undisputed facts." 
(Record on Appeal pp. 17-22.) The Credit Union agreed to the 
Bank's undisputed facts without qualification in its own 
Memorandum, and simply added reference to two affidavits submitted 
by the Credit Union. (Record p. 38; for affidavits see Record pp. 
11-13 and 32-37.) Mr. Stevens also stipulated and agreed to the 
Bank's statement of undisputed facts in his Memorandum, with one 
exception. (Record p. 57.) Mr. Stevens further added his own 
affidavit. (Record pp. 65-67.) 
The District Court's Summary Judgment recites that the Court 
reviewed all motions, memoranda, affidavits and pleadings, and 
based its decision on the undisputed facts stated in the Summary 
Judgment (see Addendum), which are as follows (Record pp. 17-22, 
38, 57, 76-79): 
1. This action deals with real property (hereinafter 
"the Property") located in St. George, Washington County, State of 
Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
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All of Lot Nine (9) , Green Valley Subdivision, 
a subdivision according to the official plat 
thereof, on file in the office of the Recorder 
of Washington County, State of Utah. 
2. Olympus Bank held a first position deed of trust 
lien in the Property in the approximate sum of $3 5,000. 
3. SUFCU [the Credit Union] held a second position deed 
of trust lien in the Property, in the approximate sum of $25,000. 
4. On September 29, 1992, Olympus Bank mailed its 
Notice of Trustee's Sale to all interested parties having any 
interest of record in the Property. 
5. [The Credit Union] received four separate envelopes, 
each containing an identical copy of the Notice of Trustee's Sale. 
6. Two envelopes were addressed to "Southern Utah 
Federal Credit Union" and two were addressed to "St. George Federal 
Credit Union nka Southern Utah Federal Credit Union." 
7. Two of the four notices were sent via regular mail 
and two were sent via certified mail, return receipt requested. 
8. The two certified mailings were received by a "Pat 
Stratton" who signed both post office return receipts on October 5, 
1992. 
9. Neither of the two notices which were sent via 
regular mail were ever returned to Olympus Bank as undeliverable. 
10. In addition to the mailing of Notices of Trusteefs 
Sale to all interested parties, Olympus Bank caused the notice to 
be posted on the subject property and in three public places in 
Washington County, Utah, on September 27, 1992. 
11. Furthermore, Olympus Bank caused the notice to be 
6 
published in The Daily Spectrum on Tuesday, September 22, 1992; 
Tuesday, September 29, 1992; and on Tuesday, October 6, 1992. 
12. The Notice of Trustee's Sale recited that the sale 
would be held at the Washington County Courthouse, at or about 197 
East Tabernacle in St. George, Utah. 
13. The building located at 197 East Tabernacle in St. 
George is the "Washington County Administration Building." This 
building does not house any of the courts. 
14. In times past, the Washington County Administration 
Building housed the Fifth Judicial District Court and was called 
the "Washington County Courthouse." 
15. Although the building located at 197 East Tabernacle 
no longer houses any courts, it is still referred to as the 
"Courthouse" or the "Old Courthouse" by many residents of St. 
George, Utah. 
16. Some foreclosure sales are still conducted at 197 
East Tabernacle and title insurance companies insure such sales. 
17. The Fifth Judicial District Court is now located at 
22 0 North 2 00 East in St. George, Utah, in a building named the 
"Hall of Justice." 
18. Representatives of [the Credit Union] had contacted 
Olympus Bank in the days prior to the trustee's sale to discuss the 
fact that [the Credit Union] would appear at and bid at the 
trustee's sale for the purpose of protecting its second lien 
position in the Property. 
19. Mr. Stevens and [the Credit Union] had discussed the 
trustee's sale over the phone approximately two weeks prior to the 
sale. 
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20. On October 20, 1992, Bob Elliott, as the 
representative of Olympus Bank, Mr. Stevens and several other 
individuals went to 197 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah, to 
witness or participate in the 10:00 a.m. foreclosure sale. 
21. The representative of [the Credit Union] and its 
counsel went to the Hall of Justice at 220 North 200 East, St. 
George,Utah, to participate in the foreclosure sale. 
22. Bob Elliott conducted the foreclosure sale at 197 
East Tabernacle and received bids from Olympus Bank, Mr. Stevens 
and one other individual. 
23. The highest bid was received from Mr. Stevens and 
Bob Elliott sold the property to him. 
24. Shortly after the foreclosure sale was conducted, 
[the Credit Union] contacted Bob Elliott to inquire as to why the 
sale had not been conducted. 
25. Mr. Elliott informed [the Credit Union] that the 
sale had been conducted at 197 East Tabernacle. 
The District Court also included certain undisputed facts 
regarding the procedural history of the action. The District Court 
then concluded "that there are no material issues of fact in 
dispute" and rendered Summary Judgment on the basis of the fore-
going undisputed facts. (Record pp. 79-81; see Addendum.) 
B. Immaterial allegations. It is implicit in the Summary 
Judgment that the District Court considered certain other facts 
asserted in affidavits filed by the Credit Union to be insufficient 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact. The Credit Union's 
Brief on this appeal contains references to allegations regarding 
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the value of the subject property which were not stipulated as fact 
and which were not presented to the District Court in any manner 
sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. The supporting statement of the Credit Union's 
representative about the assessed value of the property (Record p. 
35) was clearly hearsay and not competent or admissible evidence 
under Rule 56. See, e.g., Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation 
Corporation, 19 Utah 2d 274, 508 P. 2d 538 (1973) (hearsay testimony 
that would not be admissible at trial is not admissible to support 
or oppose summary judgment). Similarly, the statements of the 
Credit Union's representative about her own beliefs as to property 
value and her subjective bidding intentions (Record p. 35) are 
simply unsubstantiated conclusions and are insufficient under Rule 
56; an affidavit containing only unsubstantiated conclusions and 
failing to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create an 
issue of fact. Id. 
The Summary Judgment was based upon the form of the Notice of 
Trustee's Sale being in substantial compliance with the statutory 
requirements. (Record pp. 79-80; see Addendum.) The form of the 
Notice was not related in any way to the Credit Union's 
unsubstantiated opinions of the property value or its alleged 
bidding intentions, so those allegations failed to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact. Summary judgment is not precluded "simply 
whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material 
fact is genuinely controverted." Healar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 
619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Credit Union makes the definitional argument that the 
statutory term, "the courthouse", has only one possible definition; 
and the hyper-technical argument that a sale held elsewhere cannot 
possibly be valid. While the Credit Union argues that the place of 
sale was not "the courthouse", the District Court did not determine 
whether it was or was not "the courthouse." The Credit Union's 
argument simply ignores the prior decisions of this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court regarding foreclosure procedures and sales. 
Even if the Notice or place of sale were in error, the Courts do 
not invalidate sales on the basis of such immaterial errors when 
the purposes of notice have been met. The purpose of the Notice of 
Trustee's Sale is to inform persons who have an interest in the 
property of the coming sale, so they may act to protect their 
interests. 
The District Court correctly determined that the Bank's 
specification and use of the place of sale identified in the Bank's 
Notice, if erroneous, was an immaterial error because the 
objectives of the statutory notice requirement were met. All 
persons with an interest in the property were notified of the sale 
and the specific address at which the sale was to be held. The 
Credit Union admits it received actual notice and discussed the 
forthcoming sale with both the Bank and Mr. Stevens. It simply 
failed to act to protect itself, either before or at the sale. 
Furthermore, the notice requirements are intended to protect 
debtors, not creditors such as the Credit Union. The District 
Court correctly concluded that the interests of the debtor were not 
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sacrificed in the sale, and the debtor has not complained of the 
sale. The District Court correctly concluded that any injury to 
the Credit Union resulted from its own error, and the Credit Union 
cannot use its own error as a loophole or escape mechanism. 
The Credit Union's argument about "inadequacy" of the sale 
price is raised too late, is not properly supported on the Record 
and is not supported by Utah case law. The Credit Union can 
identify no fraud or unfair dealing associated with the trustee's 
sale, and the courts recognize that forced sales rarely produce 
prices near actual value. The District Court correctly declined to 
invalidate this trustee's sale. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: "THE COURTHOUSE" IS AN 
AMBIGUOUS TERM, AND ITS DEFINITION 
IS NOT THE TRUE ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL 
A. The Credit Union's definitional argument. The Credit 
Union cites Utah Code Ann. §57-1-25(2), which provides that 
trustee's sales should be held "at the courthouse of the county in 
which the property to be sold or some part thereof is situated." 
The Credit Union argues that the term "the courthouse" is so 
patently unambiguous and clear that it was error for the District 
Court to sustain the foreclosure sale. On the meager authority of 
Black's Law Dictionary, the Credit Union argues that "the 
courthouse", which the Utah Legislature left undefined, can have 
only one possible meaning. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the Credit Union's argument 
would be that the designation of the place of sale in a Notice of 
Trustee's Sale need not even include the specific address of the 
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place of sale; it would be sufficient to recite merely "the 
courthouse of Washington County" as the place of sale. The Credit 
Union would further conclude that any specific address given in the 
Notice may be ignored entirely, as the Credit Union did with the 
Bank's Notice, because "the courthouse" is such a clear and 
complete identification. 
The Credit Union's argument ignores the fact that there may be 
more than one "courthouse" in a county. The Credit Union 
stipulated that the building at which the Bank's foreclosure sale 
was noticed and conducted is still commonly called the "courthouse" 
or "old courthouse," so that the term "courthouse" is used in 
Washington County to refer to both the newer Washington County Hall 
of Justice and the former Washington County Courthouse at the 
specific address given in the Notice of which the Credit Union 
complains. (Record pp. 20-21, 38.) 
Furthermore, the Fifth District Court was well-aware of the 
fact that it sits in an Iron County "courthouse" in both Parowan 
and Cedar City, and that the District, Juvenile and Circuit Courts 
of Salt Lake County occupy several different locations. Faced with 
the reality that the term "courthouse" may in fact refer to more 
than one building or location, simple good sense prevented the 
District Court from concluding that this dispute should have been 
resolved by the blind adoption of the Credit Union's definitional 
argument. 
The true issue on this appeal is not the definition of the 
term "courthouse", it is whether noticing and conducting a 
foreclosure sale at a former courthouse, where the specific address 
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was given in the Notice of Trustee's Sale but was ignored by the 
Credit Union, is a material error. Mr. Stevens submits that the 
District Court correctly rejected the Credit Union's definitional 
argument in its Summary Judgment. The District Court correctly 
declined to determine whether the Bank's place of sale was a 
"courthouse". 
B. The "strict compliance requirement". The Credit Union 
argues that the term "shall" in the foreclosure statute makes the 
statutory provisions mandatory to such an extent that only perfect 
compliance with all requirements will allow a foreclosure sale to 
be upheld. The Credit Union's argument simply ignores the 
decisions of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court about the 
sufficiency of meeting the objectives of statutory foreclosure 
requirements and the immateriality of certain errors in notice or 
procedures. 
The objective of the notice requirements is to 
protect the rights of those with an interest in the 
property to be sold. The sufficiency of the notice 
or the validity of a subsequent sale will not be 
affected by immaterial errors and mistakes if those 
objectives are met. 
Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 
(Utah App. 1990). 
The authorities regarding immaterial errors are discussed at 
length below. The Court should note that, in every decision cited 
in Point II below, and every decision cited by the Credit Union on 
this issue (Credit Union's Brief, pp. 13-16), a failure to comply 
strictly with a mandatory or "shall" requirement was held to be 
immaterial and insufficient to justify overturning a foreclosure 
sale. 
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POINT II: THE FORECLOSURE SALE WAS 
VALID BECAUSE THE PURPOSE AND 
OBJECTIVE OP NOTICE WERE MET 
The Credit Union has challenged the District Court's 
conclusion that the Bank's foreclosure sale was valid, and contends 
that the purpose of notice was not met. The District Court's 
Summary Judgment (Record p. 80; see Addendum) recites its 
conclusion as follows: 
Notwithstanding the fact that Olympus Bank's 
foreclosure sale was conducted at a location that 
does not house a court, the foreclosure sale is 
valid because the Notice of Trustee's Sale 
adequately described the location of the sale to 
all parties with an interest in the Property. 
Consequently, the rights of all parties with an 
interest in the Property were protected and the 
purpose of the notice requirement was met. 
Mr. Stevens submits that the District Court correctly 
interpreted the facts and the prior decisions of this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
A* The purpose of notice is to provide information, and the 
Credit Union had actual notice. The Credit Union has relied in 
part upon Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 
743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987), for its proposition that nonjudicial 
foreclosure sales can proceed only in compliance with "'strict' 
notice requirements," but that case fails to support the Credit 
Union's conclusion. The plaintiff in Concepts, Inc. was a debtor 
who sought to have a foreclosure sale overturned on the basis of a 
typographical error in the notice of sale. The year in which the 
sale was to be held was incorrectly stated in the notice. The 
trial court held that the sale was void, but the Supreme Court 
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reversed that decision, holding that the notice of sale 
substantially complied with the statutory requirements. The Court 
explained: 
The purpose of strict notice requirements in a 
nonjudicial sale of property secured by trust deed is to 
inform persons with an interest in the property of the 
pending sale of that property, so that they may act to 
protect those interests. 
743 P. 2d at 1159. The Court concluded that the debtor was not 
misled by the notice and held that the notice was sufficient to 
provide the necessary information. 
In the case before this Court, as in Concepts, Inc. , the 
District Court had to determine whether the Notice of Trustee's 
Sale gave persons with an interest in the property sufficient 
information, so that they could act to protect themselves. 
The stipulated facts establish that the Credit Union was fully 
informed of the pending sale. Notice was given by recording, 
mailing, posting and publication. (Record pp. 19, 38.) There can 
be no question whatsoever that the Credit Union had actual notice 
of the foreclosure sale well in advance of the sale; the Credit 
Union's agents discussed the coming sale with both the Bank and Mr. 
Stevens prior to the sale, and the Credit Union retained legal 
counsel and attempted to attend the sale. (Record pp. 18, 21, 3 8.) 
The sale was attended by six people, half of whom made bids for the 
property (Record pp. 20, 38), but the Credit Union simply failed to 
pay enough attention to the Notice of Trustee's Sale and went to 
the wrong location. The results of that failure should not be 
imposed upon either the Bank or Mr. Stevens. 
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There was no reason whatsoever that the Credit Union could not 
have attended the sale and protected its interests. The sale was 
held precisely as specified in the Notice of Trustee's Sale. Any 
problem could have been avoided if the Credit Union had questioned 
the place of sale or objected to it at any time prior to or at the 
sale. Instead, the Credit Union ignored the information provided 
by the Notice, and failed to act to protect itself. 
The principles of Concepts, Inc. did not require the Bank to 
insure the Credit Union against its own inaction. The Bank was 
only required to provide sufficient information through notice to 
allow the Credit Union to act to protect itself, and the District 
Court correctly concluded that the notice was adequate. 
B. The objective of notice is the protection of debtors, not 
creditors. In the Concepts, Inc. case, the trustee's sale was 
challenged by the lender, who was the purchaser at the trustee's 
sale. The lender had failed to commence a deficiency action within 
three months after the trustee's sale, so it attempted to use an 
error in its own notice of sale to set aside the sale and conduct 
a new foreclosure. The Supreme Court explained: 
Defendant's argument that the flaw in the notice by 
publication invalidated the sale to it perverts and uses 
as a sword a statute that was meant to shield the 
property rights of a trustor. A sale once made will not 
be set aside unless the interests of the debtor were 
sacrificed or there was some attendant fraud or unfair 
dealing. 
743 P. 2d at 1160 (emphasis by the Court). The Court cited several 
authorities in its explanation that "[t]he reason for strict 
compliance with the statute 'is to protect the property of the 
debtor'...". Id. (citation omitted; emphasis by the Court). The 
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Court concluded that the debtor's interests had been protected by 
the foreclosure statutes, and held that the lender could not use 
its own typographical error to set aside a foreclosure sale where 
only the lender's interests were at stake. Id. at 1161. 
The District Court in the present case similarly concluded 
that the sale was valid because "[t]here is no evidence that the 
interests of the debtors were sacrificed in the sale." (Summary 
Judgment, Record p. 80; see Addendum.) It is significant that the 
debtor who was foreclosed by the Bank has not complained about the 
sale. The significance of this fact has also been recognized by 
this Court: "[T]he trustor, to whom the protections of the trust 
deed statute inure, has not challenged the validity of the initial 
sale." Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 
217, 221 (Utah App. 1990). Citing Concepts, Inc., this Court has 
also explained that "[t]he detailed procedural requirements for a 
trustee's sale of real property under Utah Code Ann. §§57-1-23 to -
34 (1986) are intended to protect the debtor/trustor." Jones v. 
Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 41 n.2 (Utah App. 1988). 
The District Court in the present case correctly applied this 
principle to the fact that there is no evidence on the Record that 
the Bank's foreclosure sale sacrificed the interests of the debtor. 
In fact, the Credit Union asserted that the debtor had filed 
bankruptcy (Affidavit of Blake, Record p. 12) and, at the Court's 
request, the Court was given a certified copy of the debtor's 
Discharge in Bankruptcy. (Record pp. 73-74.) Consequently, the 
Credit Union, but not the debtor, would be affected by the 
trustee's sale. The only complaint is by the Credit Union, a 
creditor which received actual notice of the sale and attempted to 
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attend the sale, failing to attend only because of its failure to 
pay attention to the Notice. The protections of the notice 
requirement of the trust deed statute are not intended to apply 
here. 
C. Immaterial errors do not invalidate foreclosure sales. 
This Court discussed the purpose of foreclosure notice 
requirements in Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 
791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990). In connection with its explanation 
of the principle of debtor protection, this Court explained: 
The "detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's 
sale of real property are intended to protect the 
debtor/trustor." . . . The objective of the notice 
requirements is to protect the rights of those with an 
interest in the property to be sold. The sufficiency of 
the notice or the validity of a subsequent sale will not 
be affected by immaterial errors and mistakes if those 
objectives are met. 
791 P.2d at 220 (citations omitted; emphasis added). This Court 
further explained what would constitute a material error in the 
foreclosure process: 
A party may have an apparently valid trustee's sale set 
aside for irregularity, want of notice, or fraud if there 
is evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of its 
validity . . . . [T]he only kinds of defects in the 
notice of a foreclosure sale that will justify a 
renunciation of the sale are "those that would have the 
effect of chilling the bidding and causing an inadequacy 
of price." . . . A sale once made will not be set aside 
unless the interests of the debtor were sacrificed or 
there was some fraud or unfair dealing . . . . Absent 
evidence tending to show the above factors, a trustee's 
sale will not be set aside. 
791 P.2d at 221 (citing Concepts. Inc.). Accordingly, the Bank's 
foreclosure sale is presumed to be valid, and the Credit Union 
would have been entitled to have the sale set aside only by showing 
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that an irregularity, a want of notice or a fraud had caused the 
interests of the debtor to be sacrificed through a "chilling of the 
bidding." 
There certainly was not a want of notice in the Bank's 
foreclosure. The stipulated facts demonstrate that the Credit 
Union received actual notice of the sale, and could have attended 
the sale as easily as did Mr. Stevens and the five other persons 
who apparently had no trouble understanding the Notice and who did 
attend the sale. (Record pp. 20,38.) The only "irregularity" 
alleged by the Credit Union is the place of sale, but the place of 
sale was specifically identified in the Notice and was recognized 
by at least the six persons who attended the sale. Furthermore, 
the place of sale was not just a random location, but a site at 
which trustee's sales were still being routinely conducted. 
(Record pp. 22, 38.) Finally, the Credit Union has not alleged 
that the Bank's foreclosure was affected by any form of fraud. 
Having no evidence of fraud or unfair dealing, the Credit 
Union also cannot show that the bidding was "chilled." The debtor 
has' not complained about the sale or the sale price, and Credit 
Union cannot demonstrate that the interests of the debtor were 
sacrificed, but only that the Credit Union's own interests were 
left unprotected by its failure to attend the sale. Consequently, 
the only potential bidder whose bid was arguably chilled was the 
Credit Union, since bids were received from three persons who 
attended the sale. (Record pp. 20,38.) Bidding is not "chilled" 
when an interested party simply ignores the notice of sale. The 
facts do not provide the Credit Union with any basis for overcoming 
the presumption that the sale was valid. 
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It is significant that the Credit Union does not contend that 
anyone but itself was misled by the Notice so that any other bids 
were chilled. In fact, at least six people were not misled, 
because they attended the sale, and half of them bid on the 
property. (Record pp. 20, 38.) "Defendant's statement that the 
[defect in the notice] had the potential to mislead prospective 
bidders is insufficient to conclude that it in fact did." 
Concepts, Inc. v. First Security Realty Services, Inc., 743 P.2d 
1158, 1160 (Utah 1987). 
The District Court correctly concluded that the foreclosure 
sale was valid because the Notice adequately described the location 
of sale and any error therein was immaterial. Consequently, the 
purpose of the notice requirement was met. 
POINT III: MERE INADEQUACY OF PRICE, 
EVEN IP ESTABLISHED, WILL NOT JUSTIFY 
OVERTURNING A TRUSTEE'S SALE 
A. This issue cannot be first raised on appeal. Having been 
unable to establish any material error in the Notice of Trustee's 
Sale or as to the place of sale, the Credit Union has now argued 
that the price paid by Mr. Stevens at the trustee's sale was 
"substantially inadequate" and that such inadequacy would justify 
overturning the sale. This argument is not mentioned in the 
District Court's Summary Judgment, because it was not raised by 
anything in the Credit Union's motion or memorandum, except one 
statement in the Credit Union's memorandum that "the bidding was 
'Chilled' [sic] and caused an inadequate price." (Record p. 41.) 
The issue and argument in the Credit Union's Brief on appeal was 
not adequately raised at the District Court and cannot be first 
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raised on appeal. Smith v. Iverson, 848 P. 2d 677 (Utah 1993) ("the 
trial court should have the first opportunity to address issues 
later raised on appeal"; issues not framed in complaint or in 
summary judgment motion or memorandum are not considered on 
appeal). 
B. This issue is not properly raised by evidentiary facts. 
The facts asserted by the Credit Union in support of this argument 
are entirely hearsay and unsubstantiated opinions, which are not 
sufficient to support or oppose a summary judgment motion. This 
deficiency in the Credit Union's argument has been discussed at pp. 
8-9 above. 
C. The Credit Union cannot show fraud or unfair dealing. 
Even if this Court allows the Credit Union to raise the issue of 
adequacy of price, the authorities cited by the Credit Union 
entirely fail to support its conclusion. The principle upon which 
the Credit Union relies, as it applies in Utah, is succinctly 
stated in an early case which is not cited by the Credit Union, 
First National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57 
P.2d 1401 (1936). In that case the debtor appealed from a 
deficiency judgment in a mortgage foreclosure. The mortgaged 
property had a value exceeding $8,000, but had been sold at 
sheriff's sale for only $100, leaving a deficiency of more than 
$2,000. The Court stated, without citing authorities, the Utah 
version of the principle argued by the Credit Union in the present 
case: 
It is quite generally held that substantial 
inadequacy of price, coupled with fraud, mistake, 
or other unfair dealing is sufficient to justify a 
court of equity upon timely motion to set aside the 
sale and order a resale. 
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89 Utah at 159. While it recognized this principle, the Court 
found no fraud, mistake or other unfair dealing as to the sale 
which would justify overturning it, and affirmed the deficiency 
judgment. 
The Credit Union relies heavily upon Pender v. Dowse, 1 Utah 
2d 283, 265 P. 2d 644 (1954) in which a debtor challenged an 
execution sale which was not related to mortgage financing. A 
property valued at $8,000 had been sold to satisfy a judgment for 
costs in the amount of $22.80. The Court noted that no notice of 
the sale had been given to the debtor or his attorney, the creditor 
had refused to levy on available personal property, and the 
creditor and his attorney had acted unfairly and fraudulently in 
the conduct of the execution sale. The Court affirmed the trial 
court's judgment setting aside the execution sale, on the same 
principle as recited in the Haymond case: 
It is well settled that equity will intervene and 
set aside an execution sale . . . where it appears 
the consideration was grossly inadequate and the 
sale was attended by unfairness and fraud. 
265 P. 2d at 647. Having found a "grossly inadequate" sale price 
and unfairness and fraud, the sale was correctly set aside. 
The Pender and Haymond cases illustrate that the Utah courts 
have adopted a form of the principle asserted by the Credit Union, 
without adopting the expansive language cited by the Credit Union 
from the courts of other states. Pender and Haymond further 
illustrate that the fact that a foreclosure sale price is 
significantly less than the value of the property sold is entirely 
insufficient to overturn the sale. Actual fraud or unfair dealing 
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must also be shown before a court will ignore the presumption that 
the sale was valid. 
Several of the cases cited by the Credit Union fail to support 
its argument because the courts ultimately declined to overturn a 
sale in spite of significantly low sales prices. McHuqh v. Church. 
583 P. 2d 210 (Alaska 1978) (property potentially worth $300,000 
sold for $98,000); Bullington v. Mize. 25 Utah 2d 173, 478 P.2d 500 
(1970) (property worth $97,500 sold for $25,000); Steward v. Good, 
51 Wash. App. 509, 754 P.2d 150 (1988) (property worth $64,000 sold 
for $4,870). In each instance, as in Haymond, there was not 
evidence of fraud or unfair dealing, but a mere inadequacy of 
price. The courts acknowledge that "a forced sale of land by 
auction rarely brings a price which approximates its actual value," 
McHuqh v. Church, 583 P. 2d at 214, and will not overturn a sale 
without evidence of fraud or unfair dealing. 
The other cases cited by the Credit Union, in which sales were 
set aside, also illustrate the necessity of finding fraud or unfair 
dealing. Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334 (1896) (fraud in conduct 
of successive sales); Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180 (1886) 
(creditor intentionally misled debtor); Arnold v. Gebhardt, 604 
P.2d 1192 (Colo. App. 1979) (trustee misrepresented length of 
redemption period); McCartney v. Frost, 386 A.2d 784 (Md. 1978) 
(statute required sheriff to obtain reasonable price or postpone 
sale); Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wash. 2d 170, 685 P.2d 1074 (1984) 
(creditor made no effort to satisfy claim from personal property, 
as required by statute). 
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The Credit Union's authorities establish that a mere disparity 
between the price paid at a foreclosure sale and the value of the 
property sold will not affect the validity of the sale, without 
significant evidence that the disparity resulted from fraud or 
unfair dealing. The Credit Union, by the use of hearsay and 
unsubstantiated opinions, compares Mr. Stevens's successful bid of 
$35,010 to a supposed value of $60,000 to $96,000, and concludes 
that the bid was inadequate. The Credit Union cannot point to any 
evidence, however, of fraud or unfair dealing as required by the 
courts. The Credit Union's argument is not a substitute for facts, 
and even the foreign jurisdictions which apply the principle more 
liberally would not accept the Credit Union's argument. 
POINT IV: THE CREDIT UNION CANNOT 
USE ITS OWN MISTAKE AS AN EXCUSE 
TO OVERTURN THE FORECLOSURE SALE 
The concept that a party cannot use its own error as the basis 
for overturning a foreclosure sale was a factor in this Court's 
decision to uphold a foreclosure sale in Occidental/Nebraska 
Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah App. 1990). In 
that case, the foreclosing lender had conducted two foreclosure 
sales, and its bid at the second sale was less than one-half the 
amount of its bid at the first sale, thus leaving a larger 
deficiency. The lender sought to avoid the first sale, and the 
smaller deficiency, on the basis that its own notice of sale was 
given only two months after the filing of an amended notice of 
default. This Court held that the lender had failed to prove that 
the interests of the debtor had been infringed by the notice, and 
affirmed the trial court's decision upholding the sale. This Court 
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noted that "Occidental failed to establish any compelling 
justification which would allow it to utilize its own error to 
invalidate the . . . trustee's sale." 791 P.2d at 221. 
This Court applied this same principle again only seven months 
later in Thomas v. Johnson, 801 P.2d 186 (Utah App. 1990). In that 
case, the debtor had appealed from a deficiency judgment entered 
against him after a trust deed foreclosure. It was undisputed that 
the debtor had received proper notice of sale, but he chose not to 
attend the sale or submit a bid. Consequently, the only bidder at 
the sale was the beneficiary under the trust deed. The debtor did 
not challenge the sufficiency of the notice, but contended that the 
beneficiaryfs bid of the "fair market value", without making it a 
specific dollar amount, was improper. This Court upheld the 
deficiency judgment, however: 
We can find no evidence that Johnson's [the debtor's] 
interests were sacrificed by the trustee's action at the 
November 1987 sale . . . . Furthermore, Johnson could 
have attended the trustee's sale and made a fixed-dollar 
bid to protect his own interests, but he chose not to . 
. . . Any injury to Johnson's interests resulted from 
his own inaction and imprudent judgment, not from any 
noncompliance with the statutes governing nonjudicial 
foreclosure sales. We therefore conclude that the trial 
court properly declined to set aside the trustee's sale 
in this case. 
801 P.2d at 189 (emphasis added). Even though the objection was 
made by the debtor, whose interests the statutory provisions are 
intended to protect, the debtor could not rely upon his own 
inaction and imprudent judgment to set aside a sale. 
Mr. Stevens submits that this principle applies to the facts 
before this Court. Any injury to the Credit Union was entirely 
self-inflicted. The Credit Union cannot establish that any 
25 
interested party, except itself, had any trouble attending the 
foreclosure sale. The statutes are not intended to protect the 
Credit Union from itself. 
Mr. Stevens submits that the Credit Union was not actually 
misled by the Notice of Trustee's Sale. The facts show only that 
the Credit Union's representatives simply went to the wrong 
location. The Credit Union made no objection to the Notice or the 
location of the sale until after it had failed to attend the sale. 
If this had resulted from the Credit Union's failure to read the 
Notice, that could provide no ground for avoiding the sale. If 
sales could be avoided simply by ignoring notices actually 
received, the foreclosure process would become completely 
unreliable. 
The Credit Union alleges that it did read the Notice, however. 
If so, it apparently acted on the basis of assumption by going to 
the wrong location for the sale. It would be completely 
unreasonable, however, for the Credit Union to read the Bank's 
Notice and then assume (a) that "Washington County Courthouse" 
really meant "Hall of Justice", and (b) that "197 East Tabernacle" 
meant nothing at all. If the Credit Union was misled, it was 
misled by its own false assumptions and not by anything contained 
in the Notice of Trustee's Sale. 
CONCLUSION 
The Credit Union cannot meet the burden of showing adequate 
grounds for overturning this foreclosure sale. The objectives of 
the notice requirements were met by the Notice of Trustee's Sale. 
The Credit Union either failed to read the Notice, or it read the 
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Notice and ignored it. This cannot justify overturning this sale. 
The District Court's Summary Judgment was no error, and it should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this day of August, 1993. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Bv: *&\ • ($LQL^ri (htfroLy^ . 
G. Rand Beacham 
Attorneys for Joseph E. Stevens 
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Scalley & Reading 
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ADDENDUM 
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE 
The following described real property will be sold at 
public auction to the highest bidder, purchase price payable in 
lawful money of the United States of America at the time of sale, 
at the South Steps of the Washihgton County Courthouse, at or about 
197 East Tabernacle, St. George, Washington County, Utah, on 
Tuesday, October 20, 1992, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. of that day 
for the purpose of foreclosing a trust deed executed by Herbert L. 
Norcross and Linda J. Norcross, as Trustors, in favor of Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan Association as beneficiary. The aforesaid 
deed of trust was recorded on September 14, 1976 in book 202, page 
118, entry no. 177752 in the official records of Washington County, 
state of Utah as assumed by Glenn Hafen and Linda Hafen on August 
9, 1978. The real property covered by the aforementioned deed of 
trust and this notice of trustee's sale is located at 930 South 
1420 West, St. George, Washington County, state of Utah, and is 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot Nine (9) , GREET! VALLEY SUEDIVISICM, 
a Subdivision according to the Official Plat 
thereof, on file in the Office of the Recorder 
of Washington County, State of Utah. 
The beneficiary directted the substitute trustee to 
foreclose the aforementioned deed of trust for the purpose of 
paying certain obligations secured thereby, including the unpaid 
principal balance of that certain promissory note, dated September 
8, 1976 all accrued interest to date, any late charges authorized 
C: \F 0*ECtOS\HAF EM. UTS 1 
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**• 1 V -DATED t h i s / ' T September, 1992. 
, ^ 7 4 ^ A /d'i*Z%£ 
Thomas W. Winther 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) si 
C i: ! t: In :i s; I ::; it^ f n^ptember „ I 'i'i.' „ person* I, I y ippeared 
before me Thomas W Winthet „ who being h\ me duly sworn, lid say 
tha t he is the Loan Servic ing Officer of Olympus Bank, which is 
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and said 'Thomas * inther acknowledges to me that said association 
exec uted 'the same. 
^LL 
My Commission .Expires: 
V- 4 A ?>T 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
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NOTAKY PU3UC 
ELAINE WINN 
115 Sogtn Ma.n Sl. 
Silt Lifct City. Utah 34 i l 
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MARLON L. BATES, /4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Olympus Bank, a Federal Savings Bank 
2 61 East 3 00 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHERN UTAH FEDERAL CREDIT : SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
UNION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
OLYMPUS BANK, and JOSEPH E. Civil No. 920501095 
STEVENS, 
Defendants. : Judge J. Philip Eves 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the Motions 
for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff, Southern Utah Federal 
Credit Union (hereinafter "SUFCU") and defendant, Olympus Bank 
(hereinafter "Olympus Bank"). In support of these motions, SUFCU, 
Olympus Bank, and defendant Joseph E. Stevens (hereinafter 
"Stevens") filed memoranda of points and authorities which set 
forth certain undisputed facts and presented written arguments in 
support of said motions. Furthermore, a hearing was aeld on 
December 17, 1992 at the hour of 9:30 a.m. wherein SUFCU, Olympus 
Bank, and Stevens were all represented by their respective counsel 
of record and oral arguments were heard in support of said motions. 
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• . • All of Lot nine (9] , Green Valley Subdivision; 
a subdivision according to the official plat 
thereof, on file in the office of the recorder 
of Washington County, State of Utah, 
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office return receipts on October 5, 1992. Neither of the two 
notices which were sent via regular mail were ever returned to 
Olympus Bank as undeliverable. 
In addition to the mailing of Notices of Trustee's Sale 
to all interested parties, Olympus Bank caused the notice to be 
posted on the subject property and in three public places in 
Washington County, Utah on September 27, 1992. Furthermore, 
Olympus Bank caused the notice to be published in The Daily 
Spectrum on Tuesday, September 22, 1992; Tuesday, September 29, 
1992; and on Tuesday, October 6, 1992. The Notice of Trustee's 
Sale recited that the sale would be held at the Washington County 
Courthouse, at or about 197 East Tabernacle in St. George, Utah. 
The building located at 197 East Tabernacle in St. George is the 
"Washington County Administration Building." This building does 
not house any of the courts. 
In times past, the Washington County Administration 
building housed the Fifth Judicial District Court and was called 
the "Washington County Courthouse." Although the building located 
at 197 East Tabernacle no longer houses any courts, it is still 
referred to as the "Courthouse" or the "Old Courthouse" by many 
residents of St. George, Utah. Some foreclosure sales are still 
conducted at 197 East Tabernacle and title insurance companies 
insure such sales. The Fifth Judicial District Court is now 
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c o u n s e l went »• o t he Hall of J u s t i c e a t 220 North 200 Las t , bt 
Georqn»|( Utah h i p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e f o r e c l o s u r e s a l e . Bob E l l i o t t 
i ijridui.'Leu i inn1 IDI* ei i uubui. e " iiie ijii I n inant, 1 n'lLiei niiit le mid FRCHI V •• I 
bids from Olympus Bank, Stevens and one ether individual, Thn 
hiahest bid was received from Stevens and Bob Elliott sold the 
a ' p e i : t. y I, u li i IJII 
Shortly after "the foreclosure sale was conducted, SUFCU 
contacted Roh Pllioft to inquire as to why the sale had not oe^ 
.-'..inducted , I li LI I I I, J.l .i lit, I u l ' T « ' ' i . 
conducted a t l')7 East Tabernacle . 
if i in irr PII r a n i uf? i n IT in m i n o . ' 4 
SUFCU filed the subject action for declaratory judgment 
pursuant to Rule 57 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah 
Code Annotated S 78-33-1 et seg. (1953, as amended), asking the 
Court to determine whether the subject foreclosure sale was valid 
under Utah Code Annotated S 57-1-25(2) (1953, as amended) because 
it was conducted at 197 East Tabernacle in St. George, Utah rather 
than at the Hall of Justice at 220 North 200 East in St. George, 
Utah. SUFCU petitioned the Court for a Temporary Restraining Order 
to prevent Olympus Bank from conveying title to the Property to 
Stevens while the Court determined whether the sale was valid. 
Olympus Bank and Stevens did not oppose SUFCU's petition and the 
Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order on November 12, 1992 
and continued the Order on November 12, 1992 pending a Summary 
Judgment or other dispositional hearing. 
From the undisputed facts described above, the Court 
concludes that there are no material issues of fact in dispute and 
this matter is proper before the Court for adjudication pursuant to 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court further 
concludes that although the building located at 197 East 
Tabernacle, St. George, Utah is generally known or referred to as 
a "courthouse" by the general public, it does not currently house 
any courts. Nevertheless, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that 
"The objective of the notice requirements is to protect the rights 
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ot tJiO'St ii I In i' i ."nl". er e 11 II | ivift,;., t,1, I' . Li.' " I U M T h e 
sufficiency of the notice or the validity o£ a subsequent sale will 
not be affected I'"<,'" immaterial errors and mistakes < I those 
Mehr, 791 P. 2d 217
 r 220 (Utah App. 1.990,1, 
Notwithstanding the fact that Olympus Bank's foreclosure 
sale was conducted nil ii luuai IIJII Llial... i.lrwi il  I In ni.si1 ii r n m I , I he-
foreclosure sale is valid because lihe Notice of Trustee's Sale 
adequately described the. location of the sale to ail parties with 
an interest in the Property unsequeiiil, I,y( I In." i ights f .ill 
pu'ties with, an interest In the Property were protected and the 
pur'posu of i IK' notico requirement was mer There is no evidence 
that the interests of the debtors were sacrifn. „»il I1 In. n i l c m i d 
any injury to SUFCU resulted from its own error. Because the 
f orpr Lostire na 1 v i.'.. a I id, the Temporary Restraining Order which 
prohibits the transfer of title from Olympus Bank to M:evens '...hoy Id 
be terminate l Based on the foregoing, 
IT I ". IIRPERY ORnRHI'I'i I I if Olympus Bank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment be and the same is hereby granted, The 
foreclosure sale conducted by Olympus Ban! on October 20, 1992 at 
1';» 7 Last 'I'd Liet; n..it 1 , i II M t.eeiirqe „ lit' iilm i i va I i d runi enforceable 
in every respect and the Temporary Restraining Order prohibiting* 
Olympus Bank from conveying title to the subject real property to 
Stevens which was entered by the Court on November 12, 1992 and 
continued on November 19, 1992 is hereby terminated. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Southern Utah Federal Credit 
Unions Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied and the action 
filed by Southern Utah Federal Credit Union is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice with respect to all parties. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
Approved as to form: 
Lamar J. wihward 
Attorney for Southern Utah 
Federal Credit Union 
G. Rand Beacham 
Attorney for Joseph E. Stevens 
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